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Information Uncertainty in Electricity Markets:
Introducing Probabilistic Offers
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Member, IEEE, Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE.
Abstract—We propose a shift from the current paradigm of
electricity markets treating stochastic producers similarly to
conventional ones in terms of their offers. We argue that the
producers’ offers should be probabilistic to reflect the limited
predictability of renewable energy generation, while we should
design market mechanisms to accommodate such offers. We
argue that the transition from deterministic offers is a natural
next step in electricity markets, by analytically proving our
proposal’s equivalence with a two-price conventional market.
Index Terms—Electricity markets, renewable energy, imperfect
information
I. INTRODUCTION
As generation from renewable sources of energy (RES)
reaches grid parity, RES producers are asked to participate
in electricity markets under the same rules as conventional
generators. However, keeping the support mechanisms that
were introduced to promote their development, has allowed
them to exploit their new role by employing trading strategies
that hedge their positions between day-ahead and real-time
trading floors[1], [2]. It becomes clear that for RES to remain
economically viable in the long-term, the regulation of their
participation in electricity markets has to be challenged. In
power systems dominated by RES, RES producers will have
to be held accountable for the uncertainty they bring in power
systems, by having the probabilistic estimates of their produc-
tion evaluated. Naturally, electricity markets accommodating
probabilistic offers can lead towards accountability.
In this context, we show analytically that an existing market
mechanism using deterministic offers (i.e. a two-price balanc-
ing market) can be generalized to a probabilistic market where
deterministic point forecasts are a specific case. We propose
a probabilistic market based on an affine transformation of
strictly proper scoring rules (i.e. Brier and Continuous Ranked
Probability Scores). Such functions were designed to elicit
accurate and precise probabilistic estimates from forecasters
[3] and using them as the foundation of an electricity market
achieves the same for the producers. This opens the door to
appropriate valuation and use of the uncertainty information
revealed through market participation.
II. FROM A DETERMINISTIC TO A PROBABILISTIC
ELECTRICITY MARKET
We model conventional and stochastic power production as
a possible realization y of a random variable Y , scaled in
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[0, 1]. Let Y follow a distribution with density g(y) and y0
denote the actual power production. Now, for conventional
production g is in-fact a scaled Dirac delta function i.e. all its
values are equal to 0 except at y0, with its integral over the
real line equal to 1. However, stochastic producers generate
predictive distribution densities denoted as f(y) to represent
the probability distribution, g(y). It is important to clarify that
the stochastic producers’ forecasted densities may not be equal
to the distribution of the actual production i.e. f 6= g.
The energy dispatch model consists of a day-ahead market
cleared at a price denoted by λDA followed by a real-time
balancing market which settles energy deviations w.r.t the day-
ahead schedule. Under the two-price system deviations are
priced differently depending on the sign of the imbalance;
consequently the real-time clearing price λRT is equal to λUP
or λDN depending upon to positive or negative system balance.
In a market with deterministic offers, the potential imbalance
for producers is between their reported day-ahead offer ŷ (i.e.
a point forecast) and the realized production y0 estimated by
f(y). Following the process outlined in [1], the producer’s
revenue based on that imbalance is given by:
P (ŷ) = λDAy0 +
{
(λUP − λDA)(y0 − ŷ) if y0 ≤ ŷ
(λDN − λDA)(y0 − ŷ) if y0 > ŷ (1)
In this context, a risk neutral stochastic producer determines
his offer y∗ in order to maximize expected revenue. Under
the common practice in the literature, e.g. [1], [2], that the
producer is a price-taker and therefore λDA is independent of
ŷ, the optimal offer is: y∗ = F−1(α). F is the CDF of wind
power production y and α ≤ 1 and equal to ΛDN/(ΛDN +
ΛUP), with ΛUP = λUP−λDA and ΛDN = λDA−λDN denoting
the unit regulation cost for positive and negative imbalances.
Given the above definitions of α, ΛUP and ΛDN: 1 − α =
ΛUP/(ΛDN+ΛUP). We scale P (ŷ) in Eq. (1) by multiplying by
2 and dividing by ΛDN +ΛUP. PS denotes the scaled quantity:
PS(q) =
2λDAy0
ΛDN + ΛUP
+ 2(α− I{y0 ≤ q})(q − y0)
=
2λDAy0
ΛDN + ΛUP
− QSα(q, y0) (2)
where q is a quantile forecast at level α and QSα(q, y0) is the
Quantile Score (QS), a strictly proper scoring rule measuring
in-sample goodness of fit and out-of-sample forecast perfor-
mance [3]. According to [3] QS is equivalent to the Brier Score
(BS), a strictly proper scoring rule used to verify predictions
of the occurrence of a specific event, denoted by:
BS(p, y0) = (p− I{y0 ≤ y})2 (3)
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where p = F (y) is the probability of occurrence of a binary
event {Y ≤ y} as reported by the forecaster. The predicted
event is characterized by a threshold value y, which divides a
real line in two intervals s.t. I1 = (−∞, y] and I2 = (y,∞).
The event is said to occur if y0 ≤ y, i.e. the indicator function
I{y0 < y} is equal to 1.
Based on the definitions of the scoring rules, we substitute
the QS with the BS and reverse the transformation in Eq. (2).
This yields the following expression for revenues:
P (F, y0) = λ
DAy0 − Λ
DN + ΛUP
2
(F (y)− I{y0 ≤ y})2 (4)
To this end, formulating a producer’s revenue as a linear
transformation of a strictly proper scoring rule shows that it is
possible to design a market which accepts probabilistic offers
without a complete overhaul of existing structures. In fact,
for the stochastic producers opting to use deterministic offers
or for the conventional producers and those offering perfect
estimates (i.e. ŷ = y0), the Brier Score payment reverts to the
current two-price payment.
III. EVALUATION OF PROBABILISTIC OFFERS THROUGH
THE CONTINUOUS RANKED PROBABILITY SCORE
The design of an electricity market based on a linear
transformation of the Continuous Ranked Probability Score
(CRPS) allows the use of CDFs or more realistically a set of
quantiles as market offers. Following [3] and [4] we construct
the CRPS by calculating the average BS over all possible y
values, while taking note that the CRPS can be written as a
kernel score [3]:
CRPS(F, y0) = EF |Y − y0| − 1
2
EF |Y − Y ′| (5)
where Y and Y ′ are independent random variables of the
same distribution F . The first part of Eq. (5) measures the
divergence between predictive and actual distributions, while
1/2EF |Y −Y ′| is an information measure that coincides with
the selectivity function denoted by: U(F ) =
∫∞
0
F (y)(1 −
F (y))dy [3], [5].
In the context of electricity markets the use of CRPS allows
the information measure to be associated with the day-ahead
stage of the mechanism, while divergence associates with
real-time balancing. We calculate the average revenue P by
integrating Eq. (4) with respect to the value of y s.t.:
P (F, y0) = λ
DAy0 − Λ
DN + ΛUP
2
CRPS(F, y0) (6)
IV. A PROBABILISTIC ELECTRICITY MARKET
Based on the relation between the BS, the CRPS and the
two-price system, we propose an electricity market which
accepts probabilistic offers. Such offers reveal probabilistic
information about future power production and may take the
form of a CDF, quantiles, or parameters for known distri-
butions. Both day-ahead and real-time markets are designed
based on this type of offers to achieve the following objectives:
1) The day-ahead market holds them accountable for gener-
ating forecasts of low predictive value i.e. low precision
or high dispersion.
2) The real-time market now additionally rewards or pe-
nalizes the stochastic producers based on the goodness
of fit of the distributions and the quality of the estimate
i.e. divergence from the realized production.
Regarding supply the market model is defined as follows:
Day-ahead market:
1) Each producer i ∈ N submits his distribution-price offer
(Fi, ci);
2) The market price λDA is determined based on the mean
of the reported distribution following conventional mar-
ket clearing rules;
3) Each producer receives the following payment,
PDAi = λ
DAyi − λDAU(Fi) (7)
Real-time regulation market:
1) Each stochastic producers generates outputs y0i and
up-regulation λUP or down-regulation λDN prices are
determined as in the two-price system;
2) Each producer receives the following payment,
PRTi = λ
DA(y0i − yi) + λDAU(Fi)
− 1/2(λUP − λDN)BS(Fi, y0i)
(8)
Total Payment: Based on the realization of each producer’s
production y0i , the total revenue, is given by
P (F, y0i) = λ
DAy0i − 1/2(λUP − λDN)BS(Fi, y0i) (9)
Now, since BS = CRPS, the revenue can be expressed as
an affine transformation of the CPRS, given by Eq. (6),
while also preserving the sign of the two-price payment.
Therefore, the proposed market satisfies the required objectives
of precision and accuracy, with the stochastic producers being
held accountable for the uncertainty they introduce in the
system. The proposed market motivates stochastic producers
to reveal their true estimates, while conventional producers
face no additional penalties given that there is no uncertainty
in their offers.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter proves that submitting probabilistic offers in
a day-ahead market can lead to the development of market
mechanisms which can evaluate, and consequently reward
or penalize, stochastic producers regarding the precision and
accuracy of the estimates of their production. We show a
straight forward process which can transform a deterministic
market to a fully stochastic one through the utilization of
strictly proper scoring rules. The proposed market structure
can be viewed as the generalization of the two-price balancing
market and therefore shares its favorable properties.
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